

































































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 







Case No.  19-cv-04577-JSW    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART APPLE’S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Re: Dkt. No. 71 
 
 
 Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss the revised second amended class action 
complaint filed by the defendant Apple, Inc. (“Apple”).  The Court has considered the parties’ 
papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it finds the motion suitable for 
disposition without oral argument.  N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).  The Court GRANTS IN PART and 
DENIES IN PART Apple’s motion.   
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Fumiko Lopez, Fumiko Lopez as guardian of minor A.L., Lishomwa Henry, 
Joseph Harms, John Pappas, and David Yacubian (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this consumer 
class action against defendant Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) alleging that Apple’s voice-activated “Siri” 
software intercepts speech in violation of privacy.  Namely, Plaintiffs allege that Siri is routinely 
triggered by “accidental activations” when the user neither intends nor expects it to be “listening” 
and thereafter records voice conversations.  Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Apple discloses these 
accidentally-recorded conversations to third-party contractors as part of a “quality improvement 
program.”  (Dkt. No. 70 (“SAC”) ¶¶ 4-5.)   
Plaintiffs bring claims under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.; the California 
Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code § 632; intrusion upon seclusion; invasion of 
































































privacy under the California Constitution; breach of contract; the California Unfair Competition 
Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; and for declaratory and equitable relief 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq.      
The Court will address additional facts as necessary in its analysis.      
ANALYSIS 
A. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss. 
A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the 
pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The Court’s “inquiry is limited to 
the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.”  Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).  
Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s 
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).   
Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable but 
must instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Id. at 570.  
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  Where the allegations are 
insufficient to state a claim, a court should grant leave to amend, unless amendment would be 
futile.  See, e.g., Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990); Cook, Perkiss & 
Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990).  
As a general rule, “a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”  Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted)).  An exception is documents subject to judicial notice which the Court may consider 
without converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment.  See Mack v. South Bay 
Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)).    
































































B. Analysis.  
1. Plaintiffs Have Partly Remedied Deficiencies. 
In the previous iteration of motion to dismiss briefing, the Court found the claims largely 
well-pled, but dismissed the complaint for failure to allege that Plaintiffs’ particular confidential 
communications were intercepted.1  (Dkt. No. 65 (“Order”).)  Because Plaintiffs did not allege that 
they themselves suffered from accidental activation in settings where confidential communications 
could be intercepted, they failed to show standing or state claims for laws that require a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  (Id. at 4-7, 9, 16, 18-20.)  The Court also dismissed the UCL claim for 
failure to allege economic injury, including that they “actually purchased the devices” and “saw 
Apple’s representations.”  (Id. at 21.) 
In the revised version of the complaint, Plaintiffs seek to remedy these defects by adding 
factual allegations regarding their use of Siri-enabled devices.  Plaintiffs Lopez and A.L. allege 
that they charge their devices in private settings (such as the bedroom) and have received targeted 
advertisements based on private conversations that took place near the devices, (SAC ¶¶ 16-17); 
Plaintiff Henry claims that his phone accidentally activated “at least once a week” while he used 
his device “primarily at home” and reports similar targeted advertising, (id. ¶¶ 22-26); Plaintiff 
Harms alleges that he observed Siri automatically triggering in May 2019 while having a private 
conversation inside his bedroom, (id. ¶ 34); Plaintiff Pappas alleges that he talked to his physician 
in the presence of his device in December 2020 and received targeted advertising tailored to his 
condition and branded drug afterward, (id. ¶ 41); and Plaintiff Yacubian alleges that he observed 
accidental activations in private settings, such as the bedroom.  (Id. ¶ 47.)       
On balance, the Court finds that these allegations plausibly show that Plaintiffs’ private 
communications were intercepted.  First, Plaintiffs Henry, Harms, and Yacubian allege specific 
incidents where Siri activation occurred in private settings.  Apple faults Plaintiffs for not alleging 
the contents of their communications, but the private setting alone is enough to show a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  See Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th 2002, 774-75 (2002).  Second, the 
 
1 The Court dismissed claims under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 and 2702, 
and Section 631(a) of CIPA as legally insufficient.  Plaintiffs no longer assert these claims.  
































































targeted advertising claims, while attenuated, are rendered plausible by the unique nature of oral 
communications.  While advertising tracking abounds online, there are far fewer ways to intercept 
oral communications taking place in person. 2  Thus, drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, 
the complaint plausibly alleges that targeted advertising arose from Siri interception, rather than 
another commercial auditory interception device.3   
As for dissemination, the allegations remain sparse.  Nevertheless, because the information 
regarding third-party contractors’ review of Siri recordings lies exclusively in Apple’s possession, 
Plaintiffs’ allegations of interception are sufficient at this stage.  See Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 
F.3d 910, 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (Twombly “does not prevent a plaintiff from pleading facts alleged 
upon information and belief where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the 
defendant” (quoting Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010))); Slack v. 
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 83 F. Supp. 3d 890, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Because details of 
the precise nature of Defendants’ management practice rests solely in the hands of Defendants at 
this juncture, greater specificity is not required at this pleading stage.”).   
That said, Plaintiffs still have not alleged economic injury.  Some Plaintiffs allege that they 
saw Apple’s representations while purchasing devices, but they do not rely on the representations 
for their economic injury.  (E.g., SAC ¶ 22.)  Instead, Plaintiffs claim that they stopped using Siri 
or purchased a new phone out of concern over interception, which “rendered a valuable aspect of 
Plaintiffs’ devices useless.”  (Id. ¶ 48; Dkt. No. 72 (“Opp.”) at 9.)  This injury is expressly based 
on a benefit-of-the-bargain theory.  (Opp. at 8.)  That theory, however, requires reliance on the 
alleged misrepresentation.  See Birdson v. Apple Inc., No. C. 06-02280 JW, 2008 WL 7359917, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2008), aff’d 590 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 
 
2 Apple relies on representations in privacy documents that Siri recordings are “not used to build a 
marketing profile” or “sold to anyone.”  (Dkt. No. 71-4 (“As Siri, Dictation and Privacy”) at 1.)  
However, these are the exact documents that Plaintiffs contend include misrepresentations.  (SAC 
¶¶ 171-72.)  Thus, the Court does not assume the truth of their contents.  The request for judicial 
notice is otherwise GRANTED as to exhibits A through D for the reasons stated previously.  (Dkt. 
No. 71-7; Order at 10 n.4.)     
 
3 Apple also argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations that targeted advertisements continued after Siri was 
deactivated belies their claims.  (SAC ¶ 20.)  The Court disagrees.  Once data is released to 
advertisers, targeted advertising may persist even after data collection has stopped.    
































































74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting a claim that plaintiffs “paid more for 
iPhones that they would have if they had known” of the challenged conduct absent reliance). 
Here, if Plaintiffs had purchased devices based on a subjective belief that their privacy 
would be protected and stopped using Siri after finding out otherwise, they would not have a claim 
under the UCL.  That is because a plaintiff “must do more than allege that she did not receive the 
benefit she thought she was obtaining.  The plaintiff must show that she did not receive a benefit 
for which she actually bargained.”  McGee v. S-L Snacks Nat’l, 982 F.3d 700. 706 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(emphases in original).  Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Apple made such representations, 
but unless they saw and relied on the representations when making a purchase, they have not paid 
more than in a world without the statements.  Hence, a critical element of causation is absent.  See 
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 326 (2011). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged standing for purposes of the privacy 
claims, but do not alleged economic injury for purposes of the UCL.  That claim is dismissed.  
Because Plaintiffs have alleged interception of confidential communications, they have stated a 
claim under the Wiretap Act, CIPA, and the California Constitution, as well as for breach of 
contract and declaratory judgment.    
2. Apple’s Remaining Arguments Are Unpersuasive. 
Apple also raises additional arguments that the Court has previously rejected.  The Court 
incorporates the analysis from the previous Order, but briefly re-addresses the issues. 
First, Apple argues that it did not “intentionally” intercept communications because the 
complaint now alleges that Siri alerts users when activated and mentions an article that discusses 
reduced error rates.4  (SAC ¶¶ 25, 34, 47, 72; see Dkt. No. 71-6.)  As the Court explained, this 
issue is “close,” but Plaintiffs state a claim under a theory that “Apple knows of the accidental  
Siri triggers and, instead of deleting the resulting messages, sends them to contractors to improve 
 
4 The article is mentioned twice in the complaint, which is not enough to incorporate by reference.  
See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir 2018) (the “mere mention” 
of a document is not enough).  Even if the Court considered it, the “error rate” appears to refer to 
correctly interpreting speech, not accidental triggers, so it does not directly relate to the challenged 
conduct here.  
  
































































Siri’s functioning.”  (Order at 8.)  The fact of alerting users to the activation does not change 
matters; the disputed conduct takes place after the accidental recording. 
Second, Apple argues that Plaintiffs provided consent based on the same Siri activation 
alert noted above.  Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, they did not consent.  Plaintiffs 
allege only that they were able to observe Siri being accidentally activated (including, in one case, 
by being asked what Plaintiff was searching for).  (SAC ¶¶ 25, 34, 47.)  That does not indicate that 
Plaintiff provided consent to the recording, that they observed activation in every instance, or that 
recording did not take place prior to their observation.  
Third, Apple argues that Plaintiffs have not pled a privacy violation under the California 
Constitution because two of the Plaintiffs knew of the accidental activations and the data was not 
directly associated with any user.  The Court has already rejected these arguments; they are only 
“two elements” of a “fact-intensive inquiry” for evaluating the “offensiveness” of a privacy 
intrusion under California law.  (Order at 18.)  The Court has also already rejected the breach of 
contract and UCL arguments, which are the same as in the previous motion, and incorporates its 
prior analysis here.  (Id. at 19-20.) 
Accordingly, the Court does not dismiss the claims on these grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Apple’s 
motion to dismiss with leave to amend.  Plaintiff shall file and serve an amended complaint or a 
statement that no such amended complaint shall be filed within twenty days of the date of this 
Order.  Defendants shall file their response within twenty days thereafter.  Any motion to dismiss 
shall be limited to the issue of economic injury under the UCL. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: September 2, 2021 
______________________________________ 
JEFFREY S. WHITE 
United States District Judge 
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